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Editors Preface 
We are happy to announce that the research paper series is back with 
Research Paper No. 22. The reprise of the series comes with new inputs 
from the Centre’s fellows and staff, who present insights from ongoing 
research at the KHK / GCR21. As the new visual appearance signals, the 
Centre has entered its second phase and is shifting the agenda to the core 
issues of first, Pathways and Mechanisms of Global Cooperation, and 
Global Cooperation and Polycentric Governance from 2018 to 2020, 
and second, Critique, Justification and Legitimacy as well as Compet-
ing Visions of World Order from 2021 to 2024. This research paper by 
Wouter Werner is titled ‘Godot Was Always There – Repetition and the 
Formation of Customary Law’ and marks the beginning of our second 
research period (2018–2024). The paper explores the role of customary 
law as one of the major sources of international law, which in turn regu-
lates global cooperation in various fields. Referring to Samuel Beckett’s 
play ‘Waiting for Godot’ as an intellectual inspiration, Wouter analyses a 
report by the International Law Commission (ILC) among other sources, 
and develops ideas on how rules for customary law are created and main-
tained within polycentric environments through collaborative processes 
and restatements. In doing so, he claims that repetitions are one of the 
major reasons why international customary laws exist in the first place. 
This interesting and somewhat surprising finding highlights why it is fruit-
ful to focus on the formation of such counter-intuitive pathways of global 
cooperation.
Frank Gadinger
3Godot Was Always There
Repetition and the Formation of Customary International Law
1 Introduction
In Samuel Beckett’s play, ‘Waiting for Godot’, the two main characters do ex-
actly that: they wait for a man named Godot to arrive. By now, the play has 
obtained iconic status and the audience knows the outcome: Godot will never 
come. The play shows endless anticipation, an indefinite transitory period in 
which Vladimir and Estragon are killing time (and time hits back at them). 
The big event, the arrival of Godot, whatever that may entail, is always yet 
to come. In the meantime, Vladimir and Estragon repeat over and over again:
Estragon:  He should be here. 
Vladimir:  He didn’t say for sure he’d come. 
Estragon :  And if he doesn’t come? 
Vladimir:  We’ll come back tomorrow. 
Estragon:  And then the day after tomorrow. 
Vladimir:  Possibly. 
Estragon:  And so on. 
Fast forward to 2016.  The International Law Commission (ILC) presents 
its report on the identification of customary international law.1 As may be 
recalled, customary law is still one of the most important sources of the in-
ternational legal order. Rules of customary law regulate (global) cooperation 
in a variety of fields, including the responsibility of states for wrongful acts,2 
1 International Law Commission, Identification of Customary Law, A/71/10, 2016.  
2 A recent example is the 2017 ruling of the Hague Court of Appeal, which held that the 
Netherlands was partly liable for the losses suffered by the relatives of some 350 Muslim 
men. In 1995, these men were made to leave the compound of the UN peacekeeping force 
‘Dutchbat’, and subsequently killed. The Court of Appeal decision is currently under 
review at the High Court in the Netherlands.  One of the core questions in this case is 
whether the acts of the UN force Dutchbat can be attributed to the State of the Nether-
lands. In order to answer this question, the Court turned to customary international law. 
Gerechtshof Den Haag, 27 June 2017,  C/09/295247 / HA ZA 07-2973.
4cyberspace,3 international humanitarian law,4 environmental law,5 investment 
law6 or state immunities.7 Rules of customary law have been pivotal in decid-
ing cases on controversial issues such as the responsibility of states for actions 
of UN peacekeeping forces,8 the legality of court proceedings against states 
for crimes committed in the Second World War,9 or the obligation of states to 
intensify their policies to combat climate change.10 However, rules of custom-
ary law have to be applied in what has been called a context of ‘polycentric 
governance’. This context is characterized by the fact that ‘sites for the gov-
ernance of a global problem are today generally spread across geographical 
scales (local, national, regional and planetary) as well as across social sectors 
(public, private, and public-private combinations). Moreover, the many agen-
cies which are involved with governing a given global issue frequently have 
overlapping institutional mandates, so that multiple regulators address the 
same problems in the same places’.11  For customary international law, the 
dispersed nature of global governance poses challenges at different levels. It is 
not only that its rules can be interpreted and applied in diverging ways (thus 
raising questions regarding the unity and coherence of international law),12 
but also that different agents use different methods to find rules of customary 
law in the first place.  After all, it is way more difficult to define and identify 
rules of customary law than rules of treaty law. Where treaty law is laid down 
in written, formally adopted documents, rules of customary law emerge out 
3 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, prepared 
by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
4 See in particular the restatements of customary law by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross:   Jean Marie Henckaerts & Louise Dowwald-Beck, Customary Internatio-
nal Law, Vol. I: Rules. The rules are also available via the website of the ICRC, at: https://
ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home. 
5 For a recent overview see: Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ginevra Le Moli and Jorge E. Viñuales, 
Customary International Law and the Environment, CEENRG, University of Cambrid-
ge, 2018, at: https://www.ceenrg.landecon.cam.ac.uk/working-paper-files/CEENRG_
WP_19_CustomaryInternationalLawandtheEnvironment.pdf. 
6 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (2nd Edition), Oxford University 
Press, 2015. 
7 See for example the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the case between Ger-
many and Italy, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece interven-
ing), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, 99. 
8 supra note 2.
9 supra note 7.
10 Stichting Urgenda v. Staat der Nederlanden, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden 1 Rolnr.: 19/00135 
Zitting: 12 April 2019. 
11 Research description of the thematic field ‘Global Cooperation and Polycentric Gover-
nance’, Centre for Global Cooperation Research, University Duisburg/Essen, at:  https://
www.gcr21.org/research/polycentric-governance.
12 See the report by the International Law Commission, finalised by Martti Koskenniemi: 
‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law’,  A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006.
5of the practices of states.  The very existence of rules of customary law is thus 
often a matter of legal contestation. 
It is against this background that the International Law Commission assumed 
the task to develop criteria on how to identify rules of customary law. It 
starts out from the fact that customary law today is identified, interpreted 
and applied by a multitude of agents, who do not necessarily share the same 
approach to international law. Therefore, the first step in the ILC report is the 
formulation of a definition of customary law that all agents should adopt. In 
this context, the ILC recalls the often-used conception of customary law as a 
general practice that is accepted as law by the members of a legal communi-
ty.13 In international law, this conception is translated into state practices that 
are accompanied by an opinio juris, the expressed belief that the practices in 
question are allowed, prescribed or prohibited by law. In this research paper, 
I challenge this by now common understanding of customary law, using – 
among other sources - the ILC report as an illustration. The idea that rules 
of customary law are created bottom-up, through the practices of states and 
their expressed belief, does not do justice to its temporal logic as well as to the 
crucial role that experts often play in the emergence of customary rules of law. 
In order to substantiate this argument, it is necessary to go back to Beckett’s 
‘Waiting for Godot’. 
As I will argue in the second section, the concept and formation of customary 
law are predicated on a rationale that overlaps with but also opposes the logic 
employed in Beckett’s play. Where Godot is always yet to come, customary 
law is always already there; where Vladimir and Estragon are locked in an 
eternal present through repetition, customary law grows through its restate-
ments. Based on this conception of customary international law, I study the 
importance of restatements by expert bodies in more detail in section three. 
If, as I argue, customary law only exists in and through its restatements, it is 
necessary to revisit our understanding of reports such as the one published 
by the ILC in 2016. In terms of the research agenda of the Centre, my argu-
ment could be read as an invitation to approach the formation of customary 
law more as a process of (global) cooperation. It is not the practices of states 
as such that form the basis of customary law, but the way in which these 
practices are (re)presented in dialogues on customary law. Customary law 
is formed through collaborative processes, which sometimes circle around 
common documents.14 The ILC report itself is a good illustration of this argu-
13 To mention just a few examples: Jan Klabbers, International Law, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017, 25–35; Malcom Shaw, International Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2014, 51-66; Anders Henriksen, International Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017; Antonio Cassese, International Law, second edition, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 156–157.
14 For an analysis of cooperation around common practices and documents see Christian 
Bueger, ‘Territory, authority, expertise: Global governance and the counter-piracy assem-
blage’, European Journal of International Relations, 24(3), 614–637.
6ment. The Commission is a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly, for-
mally tasked with progressively developing and codifying international law. 
It consists of independent legal experts across the world, and works in close 
cooperation with states.  The latter provide input on the Commission’s work 
in progress, in an attempt to come up with documents that solicit enough 
support from member states of the UN. The ILC report, therefore, should not 
only be viewed in terms of its content. It is also part of a collaborative process 
between the Commission and the UN Member States to arrive at a common 
understanding and approach of international customary law.
72 Time and Repetition in ‘Waiting for Godot’
It is difficult not to see parallels between ‘Waiting for Godot’ and eschatology, 
the theological doctrine of the end of times. Across different religions, the 
end of times has been associated with ideas such as final judgment, penance, 
redemption, resurrection of the dead or the return of a savior.15 Although 
Beckett himself denied that the name ‘Godot’ should be read as ‘God’ (and 
in the original French version this did not make sense indeed), the play does 
contain several references to Christianity.16 What is more, the play itself is 
built around the main characters’ anticipation of a decisive break, of redemp-
tion through the arrival of Godot. This is spelled out most explicitly in a scene 
where Vladimir and Estragon discuss how they are tied to each other— how 
they feel worse off when together, but still keep bonding up: 
Estragon: I can’t go on like this
Vladimir: That’s what you think
Estragon:  If we parted? That might be better for us
Vladimir: We’ll hang ourselves tomorrow. Unless Godot comes
Estragon: And if he comes?
Vladimir: We’ll be saved 
The idea of redemption through the arrival of a judge and savior and is predi-
cated on a progressive reading of time: as time progresses, the moment of 
salvation comes closer.  This is how time brings together past, present and fu-
ture in, for example, Christian eschatology. As Gauthier explains: ‘This view 
of time as a flowing progression from past, to present, to future, is typical of 
the system forged by Christian tradition, in which time is seen as linear and 
progressive, with a beginning, ending in a fulfilment, and experienced in a 
tension between formerly (the creation of the world and Adam’s sin), already 
(the passion of Christ), and not yet (waiting for the Parousia). This sequence 
is seen as a linear and irreversible temporal process, which is caused by and 
must repair the original sin, and which governs all humanity’17  
The progressive conception of time, however, is fatally undermined in Beck-
ett’s ‘Waiting for Godot’. Throughout the play, Vladimir and Estragon seem 
15 Jerry Walls, The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007.
16 Jonathan Boulter, Beckett: A Guide For the Perplexed, New York: Continuum, 2008. 
Boulter here mentions Vladimir and Estragon’s intensive discussion of the repentance of 
the thief that hung next to Christ at the cross. 
17 Claudine Gauthier, ‘Temps et eschatologie‘, Archives de sciences sociales des religions 
2013/2 (No 162), p. 123–141, at 128. 
 
8to have lost all sense of both place and time.  The play is located in what may 
best be described as a non-place, a spot that could be anywhere and nowhere: 
‘A country road. A tree’.  More importantly, Vladimir and Estragon prove 
incapable of securing the identity of the place: 
Estragon:  We came here yesterday. 
Vladimir:  Ah no, there you’re mistaken. . 
Estragon:  What did we do yesterday? 
Vladimir:  What did we do yesterday? 
Estragon  Yes. 
Vladimir: Why . . . (angrily). Nothing is certain when you’re about. 
Estragon: In my opinion we were here.
Vladimir: (looking round). You recognize the place? 
Estragon: I didn’t say that.
Vladimir: Well? 
Estragon:  That makes no difference. 
Vladimir: All the same . . . that tree . . . (turning towards auditorium)   
  that bog . . . 
 As this scene illustrates, Vladimir and Estragon are unable to situate themsel-
ves temporally and spatially. Their dialogue (if that) continues with a search 
for the right time: was it this evening they were supposed to wait?  Did Godot 
say Saturday? What day of the week is it to begin with?  The dissolution of 
time is also evident in other aspects, such as the leaves on the tree. In Act one, 
Vladimir says that the tree ‘must be dead’, signaling it has no leaves. Shortly 
thereafter, the tree has grown four or five leaves; something that is impossib-
le if the play would develop linearly, since less than one day has passed.  In 
this way, the play suggests that time does not really matter: the same scene 
could take place in every period of the year, over and over again.  The play 
thus combines the longing for the end of times with a conception of time that 
turns everything into an ever-lasting present.18 In the world of Vladimir and 
Estragon, time cannot progress towards the arrival of Godot: if it is impossib-
le to tell yesterday apart from today, Saturday from Friday or Sunday, Winter 
from Spring, time does not ‘go forward’ but stops functioning.  In that sense, 
Vladimir and Estragon already live at the end of time.  They live in a universe 
without movement, as illustrated by the ending of the play:
18 It is exactly this combination which gives the experience of the absurd. If Vladimir and 
Estragon had no expectation of Godot’s arrival, all that happened would just be ‘wierd’, 
but not absurd. As Camus has explained in ‘The Myth of Sisyphus’, , the absurd only 
arises out of the confrontation between human longing and an indifferent universe: ‘Man 
stands face to face with the irrational. He feels within him his longing for happiness and 
for reason. The absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need and the 
unreasonable silence of the world.’ 
9Vladimir: Well, shall we go? 
Estragon: Yes, let’s go. 
They do not move. 
The end of times is also illustrated by the role of repetition in the play. The 
play as a whole is repetitive, as the second act basically repeats what happens 
in the first.  Critics have described ‘Waiting for Godot’ as a play ‘in which 
nothing happens, twice’.19 The two acts of the play contain the same encoun-
ter in the opening scene,20 where Vladimir greets Estragon saying ‘So there 
you are again’ (Act one) or ‘You again!’ (Act two), both times followed by a 
talk on the beating that Estragon received from unnamed strangers. The rest 
of both the scenes are filled with repetitive talks and (in)actions, such as the 
plan to commit suicide or the repeated realization that they cannot leave as 
they are waiting for Godot.  The final words of each scene are the exact same, 
although the order of speakers has turned around. In Act one, it is Estragon 
who asks, ‘well, shall we go?’ and it is Vladimir who answers, ‘yes let’s go’, 
whereas in act two it is Vladimir who asks ‘well, shall we go?’, and Estragon 
who answers, ‘yes let’s go’. In both cases, the result is the same: they don’t 
move.  
Beckett’s use of repetition in ‘Godot’ is not only at odds with progressive read-
ings of history. It is also radically different from traditional, cyclical readings 
of time, which hold that the present should be modeled after some ideal mod-
el in the past. As Eliade has shown, cultures across the globe have cherished 
the idea that ‘reality is a function of the imitation of a celestial archetype’, 
while no act is recognized as valuable and real if it ‘has not been previously 
posited and lived by someone else (…)- a conscious repetition of paradigmatic 
gestures’.21  Under such readings repetition is necessary in order to turn the 
present into an instantiation of the past. However, in ‘Waiting for Godot’ 
repetition is not meant to model the present after anything else—it does not 
help to come closer to the future, nor to reinstall an idealized past. On the 
contrary, repetition is used to dissolve past and future into an ever-lasting 
present, an end-of-time, which does not come with any finality or redemption.
19 Vivien Mercier (1956), ‘The Uneventful Event’, Irish Times 18 (6).
20 Another illustration is the opening song of Act two, which contains an indefinite loop: A 
dog came in the kitchen; and stole a crust of bread; Then cook up with a ladle; and beat 
him til he was dead; Then all the dogs came running; and dug the dog a tomb; and wrote 
upon the tombstone; for the eyes of dogs to come: ‘A dog came in the kitchen….’
21 Mircea Eliade (1954), Cosmos and History, The Myth of the Eternal Return, Harper & 
Brothers, New York (translated from French by Willard R. Trask), 5.
10
3 Time and Repetition in the Formation of  
Customary Law
In customary law, time and repetition operate in ways that partly overlap 
with, but also diametrically oppose ‘Waiting for Godot’. This follows from 
the way in which customary law has been treated as a formal source of law 
since medieval times.22 Already in the 14th century, a rule of customary law 
was defined as ‘a certain law, instituted by repeated acts, which is acknowl-
edged as law’.23 Some seven centuries later, the ILC adopted a roughly similar 
definition of customary international law, stating that a rule of customary 
law exists where there is a ‘consistent and general’ practice accepted as law.24 
Where legislation or treaty law can be created through acts of will formally 
expressed at an identifiable moment in time, customary law grows out of 
practices of behavior that get accepted as law.  This conception of custom-
ary law has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice and found 
its way into virtually all textbooks and introductions of international law.25 
As the ILC has summarized: customary law consists of two constitutive ele-
ments: (a) a general practice (b) an opinio juris, defined as the ‘conviction that 
(a practice) is legally required, permitted or prohibited by customary law’.26
The element of ‘practice’ has given rise to many practical problems of identi-
fication: how widespread should a practice be before it gives rise to a rule of 
customary law? How long should a practice exist before it starts to count? 
Should the practice of states with a specific interest in the development of a 
rule carry more weight? (e.g. archipelagic states in relation to rules setting 
22 As Kadens and Young have argued, since medieval lawyers turned the concept of custo-
mary law into a formal source of law, legal theory has been struggling to grapple with 
its tensions and paradoxes. Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How Customary is Custo-
mary International Law?, William & Mary Law Review 54, 2013, 885–920.
23 Bartolus’ (1313–1357), In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria, Nicholuas 
Beuiliaquam, 1574. Quoted in Emily Kadens (2016), ‘Custom’s Past’, in Curtis Bradley 
(ed.), Custom’s Future: International Law in a Changing World, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 11–34, at 13.   
24 Draft conclusion 8 of the ILC report on the identification of customary law: . Internatio-
nal Law Commission, Identification of Customary Law, A/71/10, 2016.  
25 The term ‘general practice accepted as law’ is commonly used in international legal 
practice and scholarship. See for example:  This approach was also adopted by the Inter-
national Law Commission in its report on the identification of rules of customary inter-
national law. International Law Commission, Identification of Customary Law, A/71/10, 
2016.  The ILC report contains several references to ICJ jurisprudence where the same 
approach was embraced. The approach is also adopted by virtually all modern hand-
books and introductions to international law. To mention just a few examples: Jan Klab-
bers, International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 25-35; Malcom 
Shaw, International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014, 51-66; Anders 
Henriksen, International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017; Antonio Cassese, 
International Law, second edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 156–157.
26 ILC Report on Customary Law, at 97. 
11
archipelagic baselines, or technologically advanced states in relation to rules 
pertaining to outer space). However important these questions may be, con-
ceptually the more foundational questions arise in relation to the other aspect 
of customary law, opinio juris. As I set out above, opinio juris is defined by the 
ILC as a conviction that there is a rule, which requires, permits or prohibits 
the practice in question. In other words: to express an opinio juris is to ex-
press the belief that a rule was already in existence. The opinio juris thereby 
turns into a restatement of something that allegedly predated the articulated 
belief.  This helps explaining why the origin of rules of customary law tends 
to be obscure. This is not only caused by the fact that it is often unclear at 
what point in time a practice is general and consistent enough for a new rule 
to emerge. It is also caused by the very nature of opinio juris as a restatement: 
to express the belief that a rule exists necessarily comes with the assumption 
that the beginning and authorship of that rule lies somewhere in the past. All 
we have are restatements of an original rule that always already has begun. 
As I set out at the opening of the section, there are some parallels and fun-
damental differences between such restatements and the repeated announce-
ments of Godot’s upcoming arrival.  
First, both the conception of customary law and the main characters in Bekc-
ett’s play refer to something, which is fundamentally inaccessible and un-
knowable. Although Vladimir and Estragon constantly talk about the arrival 
of Godot, they have no clue who he is and what it would mean if he ever 
showed up. Estragon, for example, keeps forgetting his name (Estragon: His 
name is Godot? Vladimir: I think so), and when another character arrives at 
the scene, he takes him for Godot: 
Estragon:  (undertone). Is that him?  
Vladimir: Who? 
Estragon: (trying to remember the name). Er . . . 
Vladimir:  Godot? 
Estragon: Yes. 
Pozzo:  I present myself: Pozzo. 
When Pozzo asks them who Godot is, Vladimir, in the same scene, admits: 
‘we don’t know him very well’.  It also remains unclear what would happen if 
Godot showed up, with Vladimir and Estragon only speculating in vague and 
general terms about it (e.g. ‘we will be saved’).  
It may seem quite a stretch from the unknowable Godot to the identification 
of customary law. However, in both cases, that what really counts (Godot, the 
12
customary rule) remains out of reach. In the case of customary law, this fol-
lows from the idea that opinio juris is understood as the belief or conviction 
that a practice is required or permitted by law. As I set out above, this means 
that the rule in question is supposed to exist already when it is first invoked. 
This, however, creates an unsolvable conceptual problem, as it makes it im-
possible to explain how new rules of customary law could ever emerge.27 
After all, under this understanding of customary law, new rules law can only 
emerge if the legal community accepts them as valid prior to their first invo-
cation. As Watson has summarized the paradox: for a new customary rule to 
develop it ‘should arise first through custom, but at the time of the first be-
havior the law was, of course, not in existence. But the first relevant behavior 
should be accompanied by the opinio (juris et) necessitatis. Consequently the 
first behavior rested on an error and should not be counted for the creation of 
the customary law. But this also applies to the second act of behavior, which 
now becomes the first, and so on through all subsequent acts’.28  This so-
called ‘chronological paradox’ was already acknowledged as an unsolvable 
problem by medieval jurists,29 and has haunted international legal theory up 
to the present day.30 
Thus, where Godot is always yet to come, rules of customary law are always 
formed already. All we have are restatements about those rules, which presup-
pose their prior existence. There is no way to test whether these restatements 
are ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’, as this can only be done through an assessment 
based on the elements of customary law: a practice, accompanied by the ex-
pressed belief that this practice is required or permitted by law. This begs the 
question whether that expressed belief is correct, ad infinitum. 
This links up directly to the second aspect, the role of repetition. In ‘Waiting 
for Godot’, repetition locks the main characters in an ever-lasting present. 
The absurdity of the play occurs out of the confrontation between Vladimir 
and Estragon’s anticipation of salvation to come and the impossibility of any 
progress in time.  In customary law, by contrast, repetition does allow for 
movement. Repetition takes the form of restatements that represent an al-
legedly pre-existing rule. In this context, the term ‘represent’ refers to two 
27 Von Savigny & Heuser (1840), at 171, 174–175.
28 Alan Watson, The Evolution of Western Private Law (expanded edition), Baltimore & 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, at 94, 95.
29 Kadens (2016), 11–34.
30 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International 
Court of Justice, New York: Praeger, 1958, 379. Lauterpacht speaks of the ‘mystery of 
custom oscillating inconclusively between being a law-creating source of legal rules and 
mere evidence of pre-existing law’. For a recent account see Bradley (2016) and Brian 
Lepard, Customary Interational Law, A New Theory with Practical Applications, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
13
acts at the same time: restatements present the rule to an audience, which 
can either accept or reject the rule presented to them.  At the same time, they 
make the rule operative in the present; restatements bring something which 
allegedly lies in the past into the here and now. In this sense, restatements are 
forms of ‘forward repetition’- repetition that moves the past into the present 
and the future.31 Customary law knows its absurdity too, as its rules begin by 
restatements of something that cannot yet exist. However, this absurdity does 
not preclude movement: once the restatement is accepted as correct (however 
absurd that may be conceptually), the restated rule obtains validity. In other 
words: rules of customary international law exist in and through restatements 
and their acceptance by states and other authorities.  In this context, it is worth 
recalling an observation made by Crawford in relation to the question when 
a new customary regime on the continental shelf emerged: ‘One cannot tell 
what all of international law was on a given day until after that day.  Custom 
is developed by a dialogue in time.   (…) Like good coffee, international law 
has to be brewed’.32 Crawford here points at the impossibility of knowing the 
past of rules of customary law other than through their re-presentation in the 
present. What international law was, which rules of customary law already 
existed, is formed by how we restate that past in the present. This restatement 
is not just a copy-pasting of what went before, but rather a re-appropriation 
of that past, in light of how agents should behave in the future. 
31 The term ‘repetition forward’ is taken from:  Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and 
Repetition, Princeton University Press 1983 (original work from 1843). 
32 James Crawford and Thomas Viles ‘International Law on a Given Day’, K Ginther & ors, 
Völkerrecht zwischen normativen Anspruch und politischer Realität. Festschrift für Karl 
Zemanek zum 65. Geburtstag (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1994) 45-68, at 68. I found 
out about this piece through a blog by Marko Milanovic, ‘Article 75 API and US Opinio 
Juris’, EJIL Talk!, 9 March 2011, https://www.ejiltalk.org/article-75-ap-i-and-us-opinio-
juris/.
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4 Restating Restatements
4.1 Restatements by expert committees
The previous section showed how customary law arises out of acts of dou-
bling. Rules of customary law do not begin when there is a practice that is 
accepted as law, but when there is an accepted restatement of a practice as 
guided by law.  It is only through these restatements that rules can emerge 
and grow. This insight echoes Descombes’ analysis of the relation between an 
original (the ‘first’) and the reproduction (the ‘second’): ‘it must be said that 
the first is not the first if there is not a second to follow it. Consequently, the 
second is not that which merely arrives, like a latecomer, after the first, but 
that which permits the first to be the first’.33 In the field of customary law, this 
chain of reproduction continues: it is only the third that allows the second to 
be the one that permits the first to be first, and so on. What is more, in this 
chain of restatements, the meaning of the rule does not remain the same. After 
all, as I indicated above, restating a rule is not an act of neutral copy-pasting 
the past into the present, but an act that presents a rule as valid and relevant 
in new circumstances. Restatements of customary law do not take place in 
the universe of Vladimir and Estragon, where movement in time is precluded. 
Repetition (restatement) in the world of customary law is a way of  ‘updating’ 
the past, of bringing it into the present in order to relate to the future. Repeti-
tion thus brings both continuity and change. As the narrator and pseudonym 
of Kierkegaard’s Repetition has put it: ‘The dialectics of repetition is easy, for 
that which is repeated has been – otherwise it could not be repeated – but the 
fact it has been makes repetition into something new’.34   
The importance of restatements in the formation of customary law only 
grows when the role of expert committees is taken into account. Across in-
ternational law, there are several committees and institutes whose task it is 
to ‘restate’ rules of customary international law. A classical example is the 
International Law Commission, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations.  Following Article 13 (1) (a) of the UN Charter and 
article 1 of its own Statute, the ILC is tasked to promote ‘the progressive de-
velopment of international law and its codification’. The ILC Statute makes 
a strict distinction between the two tasks: ‘progressive development’ stands 
for the preparation of draft conventions not yet (sufficiently) regulated by 
international law, whereas ‘codification’ signals the ‘more precise formula-
tion and systematization of rules of international law in fields where there 
already has been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine’ (Article 
15).  As the wording of Article 15 indicates, ‘codification’ stands for restate-
33 Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, Cambridge University Press 1980, at 
145; as quoted by Sarah Gendron, Repetition, Difference and Knowledge in the Work of 
Samnuel Beckett, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze, Peter Lang, New York, 2008, 146.
34 Kierkegaard (1983), 146.
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ments of pre-existing rules. However, the wording of article 15 also shows 
that ‘restatement’ is always more than just copy-pasting: it involves ‘more 
precise formulation’ and ‘systematization’ of rules, and thus an act of repeti-
tion that adds new elements. Adding new layers of meaning is exactly the 
point of the work of the ILC: if rules would be clear enough as they are, there 
would be no need for a commission of experts to restate them. However, if 
the rules are not precise and systematic enough, if they need re-articulation 
in order to be understood properly, the work of the commission necessarily 
goes beyond the law as it stands. Another example is the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, which publishes a (continuously updated) ‘study’ 
of rules of customary international humanitarian law. This study does more 
than simply recollecting rules that are out there already. First and foremost, 
the ICRC study is an attempt to instruct states and other agents on how rules 
of customary law are to be applied to current phenomena.35 In addition, the 
study presents the rules as part of a larger system, with its own logic and un-
derlying principles: ‘The ICRC study also represents an excellent opportunity 
to view international humanitarian law in its entirety, asking what purpose 
it has served and how it has been applied, studying the relevance of its vari-
ous provisions and determining whether some of the problems encountered 
today do not call for a fresh look at this or that provision’.36 Other examples 
can be found in ad hoc commissions, such as the ‘Tallinn Group of Experts’, 
an international group of experts that was brought together on the initiative 
of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence. The group of 
experts drafted the so-called Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the Law Applicable to 
Cyberoperations (Tallinn 2.0).37 Its principal aim is to explicate which rules 
of customary international law are applicable to a wide variety of cyber op-
erations. The Manual was written in response to new challenges posed by 
the digital revolution. The world of cyber gave birth to new social relations, 
new forms of communication and novel possibilities of inflicting harm. What 
is more: the digital revolution gave rise to the idea that changes in the future 
may come at higher speed and thus with greater unpredictability than before. 
The Manual was put together to make sense of these developments and the 
uncertainties they carry along. Tallinn 2.0 does so by restating what is already 
out there: rules of customary international law, some of which have existed 
35 As the study puts it: the problem is not to know whether given rules exist or not but 
rather how to interpret them. Jean Marie Henckaerts & Louise Dowwald-Beck, Custom-
ary International Law, Vol. I: Rules, at xxiii. The rules are also available via the website 
of the ICRC, at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home.  
36 Idem, at xxii.
37 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, prepared 
by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
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for more than a century.38 However, Tallinn 2.0 does more than simply restate 
what is out there; it also to instruct states how to apply existing law to new 
phenomena, in light of the system of international law as a whole. In the case 
of Tallinn 2.0, the aim is even to instruct states on how they should apply 
existing customary law to events in cyber that have not taken place yet, and 
may as well never occur at all.39  
Restatements of the law by expert committees thus necessarily go beyond 
copy-pasting a pre-existing rule. Instead, they provide instructions on how 
existing law is to be applied to new phenomena, thereby adding new layers of 
meaning to the restated rules. In addition, they not only restate rules, but also 
present them as part of a larger legal regime with underlying principles and 
coherence, thereby restating and presenting this regime as well.  Of course, 
the fact that expert committees restate certain rules does not as such turn 
them into rules of international law. Somehow, the restated rules need to be 
validated by other authorities, in particular by states or international judicial 
bodies. This explains why the International Law Commission is engaged in a 
constant dialogue with states when drafting reports, and why it seeks formal 
adoption of its conclusions by the General Assembly.  Other expert bodies 
cannot rely on pre-existing formal procedures to involve states in the drafting 
of restatements. However, they too seek support from states through different 
channels. The ICRC, for example, involved academic and governmental ex-
perts in the drafting process of its customary law study, while receiving – and 
responding to - formal governmental responses to its end products.40 In an 
even less formalized way, Michael Schmitt, the chair of the Tallinn 2.0 group 
of experts, solicited support for Tallinn 2.0, e.g. in some seminars organized 
in cooperation with states. In this way, the findings of the Manual could be 
explained to its main target group, legal advisors. In addition, the restated 
rules could be further strengthened through the support by states.   
The interaction between expert committees and states once more illustrates 
how customary law evolves through restatements. The committees claim to 
38 The Tallinn Manual fits in a longer tradition in international humanitarian law. Since 
the late 19th century, international groups of experts have produced manuals in specific 
fields such as naval warfare, non-international armed conflicts or air and missile warfare: 
the 1913 Oxford Manual on the Laws of Naval War Governing the Relations Between 
Belligerents; the 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed 
Conflicts at Sea, the 2006 San Remo Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed 
Conflict, the 2009 Harvard Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile 
Warfare, and the 2013 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare.   
39 For an analysis see Lianne Boer & Wouter Werner, ‘It Could Prabaly Just as Well Be 
Otherwise: Imageries of Cyberwar’, in Monika Ambrus, Rosemary Rayfuse & Wouter 
Werner, Risk and the Regulation of Uncertainty in International Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017, chapter three. 
40 See for example Jean-Marie Henckaerts ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law: a 
response to US comments’, International Review of the Red Cross, 89 (866), 2007, 473-
488 V89 (866), 2007. 
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restate rules that already emerged from the practice and opinio juris of States. 
However, the fact that it is necessary to restate (and update and systematize) 
these rules shows that states themselves apparently did not have sufficient in-
sight into the customary law they had created. Therefore, the reports, studies 
or manuals produced by expert bodies present these rules anew to states. If 
States treat these re-presentations as correct, the rules they express are vali-
dated as pre-existing. Whether these rules in fact existed before they were 
restated is often beside the point. Not only can the acceptance by states itself 
be regarded as the expressed belief that a rule exists. More fundamentally, 
the very nature of customary law makes such an assessment often difficult to 
carry out. As I set out in section 1, customary law only exists by virtue of its 
restatements and their acceptance by the legal community. Just like Godot re-
mains unknowable for Vladimir and Estragon, the origin of a rule of custom-
ary law remains out of reach. If a rule of customary law is to remain valid, it 
has move forward through restatements.  
4.2 The 2016 ILC Report
The 2016 report by the International Law Commission takes the role of re-
statements to yet another level. The report was written in response to the 
growth of international law and the proliferation of different forms of trans-
national cooperation. As a result, the ILC holds, more and more non-special-
ists are confronted with questions regarding the formation and identification 
of customary international law. These non-specialists include ‘those working 
in domestic courts of many countries, those in government ministries other 
than Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and those working for non-governmental 
organizations’.41 The aim of the ILC report is to facilitate a common under-
standing of how customary law is to be found and applied. The focus of the 
report thus is on so-called ‘second-order’ rules of customary law: the rules 
that determine how substantive rules of customary law can be identified. This 
raises the question of where these second order rules come from. The report 
does not come up with an explicit answer to this question. However, the 
report does indicate indirectly where these rules can be found. According to 
the ILC, its ‘draft conclusions reflect the approach adopted by States, as well 
as by international courts and tribunals and within international organiza-
tions’.42 The ILC report here echoes approaches that have treated the rules 
that determine how customary law is made (and can be found) are themselves 
customary law. Meijers, for example, has treated these rules as ‘secondary 
rules’ in the Hartian sense, rules that determine how other rules can be made 
41 ILC report (2013), 5. The same argument is made in the ILC report of 2016, at 79 (supra 
note xx). 
42 ILC report (2016), 80.
18
and recognized.43 However, this only begs the question: whose practices count 
as relevant for identifying the (secondary) rules of recognition? How do we 
know that we have identified the right practices to find rules of customary 
law?
According to the ILC, what counts are the practices of courts, states and inter-
national organizations. Restating their practices help to ensure that one only 
identifies those rules of customary law that ‘actually exist’.44  The ILC report 
itself thereby becomes a restatement of these past practices, which seeks to 
guide behavior of those who are called to apply customary law in the future. 
This implies that the report is unavoidably more than just a description of 
what states, courts and international organizations have done so far. The re-
port confirms, and thereby strengthens, the power of these agents by singling 
out their practices as the ones that matter. One may wonder, for example, why 
the methods used by informal bodies, non-governmental organizations or ac-
ademics do not count. The report cannot answer this question, other than 
through circular reasoning: these are not (necessarily) the methods used by 
states, courts and international organizations. What is more, the report also 
indirectly critiques certain practices, e.g. the method for the identification of 
rules of customary law by the ICTY in the Kupreskic case.45 The ILC report, 
therefore, is more than a restatement of what is out there.  It wavers between 
restating how states, courts and international organizations identify rules of 
customary law and how they ought to do so.  The ILC report thereby becomes 
yet another presentation of restatements—a presentation that obtains validity 
for those members of the international community it deems most relevant if 
they accept it as correct.   
In this context it is interesting to take a closer look at the way in which the 
ILC develops its restatements. The report claims that the restatements reflect 
what states, courts and international organizations do when they identify a 
rule of customary law.46 This may be correct, but the report does not offer 
much evidence of the concrete practices of states and international organiza-
tions to back up this claim. State practice and the practices of international 
organizations are mentioned, but only as elements of customary law. The re-
port does not restate how states and international organizations concretely 
determine the existence of rules of customary law; which criteria they use to 
43 Herman Meijers (1979), ‘How is International Law Made?’, Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 3–26, 3.  
44 ILC report (2016), 82.
45 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago 
Josipovic, Dragan Papic, Vladimir Santic, IT 95-16, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 14 Janu-
ary 2000. In this case, the Tribunal held that, when it comes to belligerent reprisals, ‘prin-
ciples of international humanitarian law may emerge through a customary process under 
the pressure of the demands of humanity or the dictates of public conscience, even where 
State practice is scant or inconsistent’.
46 ILC report (2016), 80.
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identify rules of customary law. By contrast, the report heavily relies on the 
way in which the International Court of Justice has identified rules of custom-
ary law. All the main findings of the report are backed up by examples from 
the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. The very definition of 
customary law as consisting of state practice and opinio juris, for example, 
is justified by reference to Article 38 as well as to the Nicaragua case, the 
North Sea Continental Shelf case, the 2012 Jurisdictional Immunities case, 
the 1985 Continental Shelf case, the Colombian-Peruvian asylum case, the 
Rights of Passage case, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the Pulp Mills 
case and Nicaragua v. Colombia Territorial and Maritime Dispute case.47  The 
only other source mentioned in this context is the Norman case before the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone.48 A similar trend is visible when it comes to 
conclusions such as those pertaining to the assessment of evidence for cus-
tomary law,49 the forms of state practice that matter for the identification of 
customary law,50 the assessment of state practice,51 the general nature of state 
practice,52 opinio juris and evidence thereof53 or the status of resolutions of 
international organizations.54  
This approach is even more interesting when we take a closer look at how the 
International Court of Justice actually identifies rules of customary law. The 
ILC rightly points out that the International Court of Justice routinely states 
that rules of customary law can only be identified if there is a general state 
practice accepted as law.55 And indeed, sometimes the Court identifies rules 
of customary law (or the absence thereof) on the basis of a direct analysis of 
the two elements. In the Colombian-Peruvian asylum case, for example, the 
Court critically examined a large number of cases regarding diplomatic asy-
lum referred to by the Colombian government.56 In the Arrest Warrant case, 
the ICJ ‘carefully examined state practice, including national legislation and 
those decisions of national higher courts (…).’57 I have selected these two ex-
amples on purpose, as they both ended in a negative conclusion: based on an 
analysis of state practice and opinio juris, the Court concluded that no rule 
47 ILC report (2016), 82–84.
48 ILC report (2016), 84.
49 ILC report (2016), 84–87.
50 ILC report (2016), 91–92.
51 ILC report (2016), 92–93.
52 ILC report (2016), 93–96.
53 ILC report (2016), 96–101.
54 ILC report (2016), 106–109.
55 ILC report (2016), 82.
56 Colombian-Peruvian asylum case, Judgment of November 20th 1950: I.C.J. Reports 
1950. 
57 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, para 58.
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of customary law could be detected. This confirms the observation by Men-
delson that ‘The Court’s tendency, indeed, is to invoke formal requirements 
mainly when it wants to say that an alleged customary rule is not one’.58  This 
trend has continued in the 21st century.  In several cases, the ICJ did engage 
in a more detailed analysis of state practice, to conclude in the end that there 
was insufficient proof of a rule of customary law.59 Where the Court came to a 
positive finding, this was generally based on alternative sources such as treaty 
provisions60 or previous case law.61  
 Generally speaking, the ICJ has relied more on alternative sources than on 
an independent analysis of state practice and opinio juris. In other words: 
the Court has frequently invoked restatements of customary law to back up 
its own conclusions.  This can be derived from one of the few quantitative 
studies on the determination of customary law by international courts.62  The 
study is based on an analysis of all the judgments of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and the International Court of Justice, supplemented by 
all non-World Court decisions mentioned in the 2013 ILC customary law re-
port.63 The authors found that references to ‘classical’ evidence of state prac-
tice, and opinio juris, governmental statements and behavior of states, were 
respectively cited in only 8% and 7.4% of the cases where courts identified a 
rule of customary law (or the absence thereof). Domestic statutes and domes-
tic jurisprudence were cited in 10.3 and 11.4% of the cases respectively.64 In 
practice, it turns out that restatements of customary law by scholars (18.3%), 
UN Reports (24%), reports written by international committees (25.7%) or 
case law of international courts and tribunals (38.9%) are invoked much 
more frequently. In this context, it is interesting to note that the International 
Court of Justice also makes use of reports by the International Law Com-
mission, generally without further enquiring whether the findings of the ILC 
actually reflect state practice and opinio juris. As Talmon puts it, ‘Reference 
to the International Law Commission is a favourite shortcut in establishing 
rules of customary international law. (…) In all cases, the ILC has served as 
58 Mendelson (1996), 180.
59 For an analysis of ICJ case law on customary law since 2000 see Aleberto Alvarez-Jime-
nez (2011), ‘Methods for the Identification of Customary International Law in the Inter-
national Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence: 2000-2009’, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, vol. 60, 681–712.  
60 Case Concerning Certain Questions of mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti 
v. France), Judgment of 4 June 2008, para 174.
61 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, para. 88.
62 Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, ‘Customary International Law- How do Courts do It?’, in: 
Bradley (2016), 117–147.
63 Choi & Gulati (2016), 126.
64 Choi & Gulati (2016), 135. All the percentages mentioned in this paragraph are taken 
from figure 5.2 presented by Choi & Gulati at 135.
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a kind of pseudo-witness for a rule having acquired the status of customary 
law’.65 This implies that there is an interesting cross-referencing going on. The 
International Law Commission argues that the proper method to find rules of 
customary international law is the one developed by the International Court 
of Justice. The Court, in its turn, argues that outcomes of ILC reports can be 
used as evidence of customary law, even without further  enquiry into the 
underlying materials. 
By far the mostly cited evidence of a rule of customary law by international 
courts is  international treaties (62.9%). Of course, it is possible that courts 
cite treaties because they argue that the treaty rule in question codifies pre-
existing customary law. However, as Choi and Gulati argue, ‘this does hap-
pen. But it happens rarely. (…) We found such indications in fewer than 20% 
of the determinations’.66  In other words, international courts, including the 
World Court, most often restate treaty rules as valid restatements of custom-
ary law, without direct analysis of the possible underlying state practice and 
opinio juris. 
65 Stefan Talmon, ‘Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology bet-
ween Induction, Deduction and Assertion’, The European Journal of International Law 
(2015) Vol. 26 no. 2, 417–443, at 437.
66 Choi & Gulati (2016), 133.
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5 Conclusion:  One Day…
In this paper I have argued that customary law essentially consists of a dia-
logue (or contestations) about restatements of law.   Rather than being a 
matter of practices that get accepted as law, customary law is a process of 
collective sense making of restatements by a variety of actors, including states, 
courts and legal experts.  This argument not only follows from the way in 
which rules of customary law develop de facto.  It also follows from the very 
concept of customary law as a set of rules that is based on two elements: a 
general practice and an opinio juris. The second element expresses the belief 
that a rule of customary law already exists. As a result, rules of customary law 
are always presented as pre-existing the first opinio juris that was supposed to 
call them into existence.  This paradox lies at the heart of customary law and 
helps explaining why rules of customary law arise and persist only through 
cooperative processes. 
In order to explicate the cooperative nature of customary law, I have con-
trasted its assumptions and logic with Samuel Beckett’s ‘Waiting for Godot’. 
In the second Act, Pozzo summarizes the workings of time and repetition in 
the play. When asked when his slave Lucky (who gave a long speech in the 
first Act) turned dumb, he replies in anger: ‘Have you not done tormenting me 
with your accursed time! It’s abominable! When! When! One day, is that not 
enough for you, one day he went dumb, one day I went blind, one day we’ll 
go deaf, one day we were born, one day we shall die, the same day, the same 
second, is that not enough for you?’ Lawyers are supposed to be more calm 
and distanced. Yet, they too could answer to the question of when exactly a 
rule of customary law emerged: one day it emerged, one day it was solidified, 
one day it became common knowledge- is that not enough for you? How-
ever, lawyers cannot give this answer without allowing for movement in time. 
Where Pozzo illustrates how time and repetition create an everlasting present 
for the characters in the play, customary law moves forward through acts of 
repetition. Where ‘Waiting for Godot’ is predicated on the ever-receding ar-
rival of Godot, customary law is predicated on the assumption that its rules 
were always already there. This is expressed in the opinio juris, the belief that 
a practice is allowed, permitted or prohibited by law. As I have argued in this 
paper, opinio juris must be understood as a restatement of something that 
remains principally inaccessible. Restatements, however, necessarily breed dif-
ference: even if the text remains the same, the context changes. As meaning 
depends on context, restatements add new layers of meaning to rules that 
they present as pre-existing. This is not only done by states, but also (and 
increasingly) by expert committees such as the International Law Commis-
sion, the Tallinn Group of Experts or the legal experts of the ICRC who are 
tasked with restating rules of customary humanitarian law. These committees 
present restatements to states, whose acceptance validates the restated rules 
as pre-existent. Recently, this has even been done in relation to the secondary 
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rules of customary law. In 2016 the International Law Commission presented 
a report on how rules of customary law are to be identified. The ILC presented 
the report as a restatement of the way in which states, international organiza-
tions and courts identify such rules.  As it turns out, the report was based on 
a concept of customary law that does not entirely fit the practices it restates. 
However, the ‘original sin’ of the report can be redeemed through movement 
in time: if states, courts and international organizations accept the findings of 
the report as valid, the restated practices will be treated as pre-existent. Where 
Vladimir and Estragon remain locked in the present, customary law is only 
possible on the assumption that Godot was always there already. 
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Abstract
Rules of customary law figure prominently in today’s law and policy. Across 
policy fields, courts and policy-makers are called to interpret and apply custo-
mary law. However, it is still a bit of a mystery how rules of customary law 
emerge and how they can be identified in the first place. In this paper, I set out 
why the mystery of customary law is bound to remain unresolved. Customary 
law cannot be treated as a body of rules ‘out there’, ready for application 
by domestic, regional or global authorities. Instead, it is part of a process of 
global cooperation where rules of customary law emerge and grow because 
they are restated. Rules of customary law only exist if they are successfully 
presented as already there.
Keywords  repetition, customary law, expert commitee, International Law 
Commission, pathways, polycentric governance
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